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ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses the matter of agency and intention in Shakespearean 
tragedy from a perspective defined by akrasia, or the perplexity which is 
posed by a character who wilfully makes a decision (either for action or 
passivity) the effect of which is contrary to his/her interests —even when 
everything (in this case, the dramatic situation) indicates s/he should be 
aware of its consequences. This discussion explores and questions notions 
of irony as they have traditionally emerged in tragic theory, and will give 
particular attention to the imbrications between akrasia, irony and gender 
typecasting in Othello and Antony and Cleopatra. Indeed, the paper will 
examine the extent to which akratic traits come to prevail in Shakespeare’s 
delineation of the tragic in these plays, and how such traits also become 
integral to the playwright’s ambivalent positing of gender profiles. These 
are represented at their clearest through (in)action and its results, as the 
tragic plot progresses to its outcome. 
 
No man voluntarily pursues evil, or that which he thinks to be evil. To 
prefer evil to good is not in human nature; and when a man is 
compelled to choose one of two evils, no one will choose the greater 
when he may have the less. 
Plato, Protagoras 358d 
 
A man has practical wisdom not by knowing only but by being able to 
act; but the incontinent man is unable to act – there is, however, 
nothing to prevent a clever man from being incontinent; this is why it 
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is sometimes actually thought that some people have practical wisdom 
but are incontinent (...) nor yet is the incontinent man like the man who 
knows and is contemplating a truth, but like the man who is asleep or 
drunk. 
Aristotle, Ethics VII.10 
 
 
The sense of a stark mismatch between volition and action, intention and achievement, 
has traditionally been at the core of western understandings of the major dramatic sub-
genres —i.e., of the representations of human behaviour that energise comic and tragic 
plots and have long claimed a supra-individual significance. In comedy, this has usually 
accompanied a diagnosis of human insufficiency translated into inadequate/incompetent 
behaviour. At its simplest, such inadequacy has often led to the comic being regarded as 
equivalent to the risible, and, in rather more elaborate disquisitions (such as Aristotle’s 
in the Poetics), justified the commitment of comedy to representing “characters of a 
lower type” (Poetics V), demeaned by traits the perception of which determines our 
own cherished superiority when judging their attempts to enact their desires. In tragedy, 
the perceived clash more often than not involves a diagnosis of excess in traits (power, 
persistence, strength of will) that (if mitigated) might secure unqualified success, but in 
their fullness spell disaster, aided by misjudgement. This fatal mismatch often pits 
character against circumstance in such terms that both the misjudgement and the 
outcome appear inevitable, against a background of design. Indeed, this sense of 
inevitability and overarching design applies irrespective of the dominant cultural 
rationale that one may invoke for construing a human plight in tragic terms: despite 
their huge historical and intellectual differences, it informs both that conflation of 
(pagan) Fortune and divine Providence which so starkly determined the 
conceptualisation of tragedy within a late medieval mindset1, and the ‘law of probability 
or necessity’ that Aristotle theorised in the Poetics (VII: 7; 1895: 31). 
In this paper I will be focusing, however, on instances in Shakespearean tragedy 
when that conflict might appear to audiences as indeed avoidable; when characters 
wilfully make decisions (either for action or passivity) the effect of which is contrary to 
their interests —even when everything (in this case, the dramatic situation) indicates 
they should be aware of the odds and consequences. This arguably corresponds, in 
rough terms, to the perplexity that both Plato and Aristotle discussed as akrasia. Since 
the concept will here be employed as a heuristic and operative device with which to 
approach the challenges posed by characterisation in Shakespearean tragedy, I opt to 
draw on those aspects of Plato’s and Aristotle’s respective discussions of akrasia that 
are arguably convergent and complementary, rather than divergent. Particular interest 
will therefore be taken in Socrates’s perception of that unnatural preference (often 
referred to as ‘the Socratic paradox’) for ‘evil’ over ‘good’, or for the greater over the 
lesser of two evils, that strikingly foregrounds the “inferiority of a man to himself” 
(Protagoras 358 /Jowett 1892: 183); and in the contrast between akratic (often rendered 
as ‘incontinent’) and enkratic persons —literally, lacking or having ‘mastery’, 
especially over themselves— when faced with the challenges that passions pose to their 
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capacity for reason, as posited and discussed by Aristotle in the Ethics (VII. 1-10). 
Aristotle’s understanding that the akratic may have their capacity for rational 
deliberation impaired by either impetuosity or weakness; and, concomitantly, by an 
“appetite for pleasure” or by “anger”, provides conceptual tools that may prove 
productive in a discussion of Antony and Cleopatra and Othello. I will also take into 
consideration the fact that both plays, when their respective strategies for 
characterisation (for representing ethoi) are discussed from this particular angle, bring, 
through their female characters, matters of gender (and gender differentiation) into play 
that were largely absent from the classical framework for the concepts in question. 
The opening of Antony and Cleopatra would seem to epitomise an akratic profiling 
of Antony as a case in which reason, and the capacity for deliberation, is jeopardised by 
an unchecked and overwhelming appetite for pleasure. Indeed, from the displeased 
opening interjection, “Nay”, to the diagnosis and indictment carried by its closing word, 
“lust”, Philo’s ten-line description of “this dotage of our general’s” accounts for the 
decline of the man of action from his performative capacities. Such capacities are troped 
at their most exalted in the enactment of Antony’s will through the ordering power held 
by “his goodly eyes” upon “the files and musters of the war”; and their decline has its 
nadir in the domestic and sexual abasements represented by “the bellows and the fan” 
(1.1.1-10) —as Shaw was memorably to put it, “a faithful picture of the soldier broken 
down by debauchery” (cit. Neill 1994: 69-70). This diagnosis is ostensibly confirmed in 
the same scene by Antony’s own dictum, “not a minute of our lives should 
stretch/Without some pleasure now” (1.1.47-8), by his propensity to swear “for the love 
of Love and her soft hours” (1.1.45), and by his ensuing dismissal of the messenger, 
whose “news (...) from Rome” required deliberation and response (1.1.18, 56). Further, 
this abstention from action and decision in the name of pleasure is apparently credited 
doubly to the two traits that in Aristotle explain the limitations of the akratic: 
impetuosity, as seen in Antony’s impatience with the messenger; and weakness —to the 
extent that he yields to Cleopatra’s discursive and histrionic manipulations with a 
proneness that later obtains an emblematic representation in Cleopatra’s reminiscence 
of the couple’s gender reversals: “I drunk him to his bed,/Then put my tires and mantles 
on him, whilst/I wore his sword Philippan” (2.5.21-3). 
Antony’s characterisation as a possible embodiment of akratic man is, however, 
more complex than these lines would suggest, since the character alternates, in the 
course of the play, between spectacular impairment of his capacity for rational decision-
making and brooding, clear-headed assessment of his circumstance. The latter stance 
becomes manifest no later than 1.2, when Antony receives the messengers, 
acknowledges in soliloquy that “Ten thousand harms, more than the ills I know,/My 
idleness doth hatch”, and replies to Enorbarbus’s tellingly phrased, “What’s your 
pleasure, sir?” with a curt, “I must with haste from hence” (1.2.135-9). Other 
occurrences of such (self-)awareness —or rather, of what Cleopatra refers to as “a 
Roman thought” (1.2.88)— see Antony rise to the political challenge posed by 
negotiations with (Octavius) Caesar in 2.2.; briefly regain, late in Act 4, those 
conditions for strategic command and military prowess (the loss of which Philo rued at 
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the beginning) that allow him to be hailed again by a soldier as “brave emperor” (4.7.4); 
and offer, once everything is lost, that analysis of a fluid, cloud-like self, discontinuous 
with material form, that precedes his bid for an honourable, “Roman” death in 4.14. 
Such moments, however, only highlight even more clearly the conditions that 
Antony paradoxically has for deliberating and following reason, rather than making 
options that audiences can identify as arising from wrong or (when impetuously made) 
non-reasoned choices that ultimately doom him, options that make him seem again and 
again (in Socratic terms) “inferior to himself” —the text is in fact punctuated by 
allusions to Antony becoming “short of that great property/Which still should go with 
Antony” (1.1.58-9). Indeed, his akratic profile derives additional density from the fact 
that the impulse to a realisation of agency that audiences can see as entailing effects 
contrary to Antony’s own intents comes not just from his (permanent) “appetite for 
pleasure”, but also from the other (tendentially incidental) vulnerability to passion that 
Aristotle detects as integrating the conditions for akrasia: anger. 
In Antony’s characterisation, anger may on occasion appear as indistinct from 
courage, that which, again in Philo’s saying, made “his captain’s heart” burst through 
any material boundaries. The major difference, however, is that Antony’s bouts of anger 
fuelled by impetuosity, rather than by reasoning, diminish rather than magnify him —
denying him, therefore, that Mars-like or Herculean grandeur (“the demi-Atlas of this 
earth, the arm/And burgonet of men!” —1.5.24-5) which Cleopatra so vocally 
celebrates. Again, a perception of this is enhanced by moments of self-awareness: 
“You’ll heat my blood” (1.3.81), he cautions in a moment of impatience at Cleopatra’s 
transparent manipulations; but it is especially damning that Antony’s anger should, on 
some of its most debasing occasions, be aimed at a woman (Cleopatra), and/or take self-
denunciatory forms. This is the case when jealousy prompts him to level abuse at 
Cleopatra —“kite”, “boggler” (3.13.94, 115)— and order Caesar’s fawning envoy to be 
brutally punished. The self-cancelling disproportion of his rage is signalled by Antony’s 
own admission of ebbing power —“Authority melts from me” (3.13.95)— and by 
Enobarbus’s remark on the dangers of “playing with (...) an old (...) dying [lion]” 
(3.13.99-100); while Antony’s personal challenge is laughingly received by Caesar, 
who labels him an ineffectual “old ruffian” (4.1.4) and thus marks Antony’s 
degradation from “triple pillar of the world” (1.1.12) to an embodiment of the miles 
gloriosus. The ultimate step in this self-abasing and bitterly ironical process comes with 
Antony’s inability to kill himself in one stroke, which, following on his accusation-
cum-complaint to Cleopatra’s eunuch —“O thy vile lady!/She has robbed me of my 
sword” (4.1.4.22-3)— reminds us of how often Antony’s akratic shortcomings are 
represented through tropes of sex and gender. 
Such implications suggest that the heuristic value of notions of akrasia for a critical 
consideration of tragic characters and agency, on the basis of a defining mismatch 
between intention and effect, can be productively tested also with regard to 
Shakespeare’s Cleopatra. The challenges posed by female agency have long defined a 
relevant strand in the play’s critical processing, but a discussion of the contradictions 
that mark this key female character as regards volition, action and achievement may 
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enhance our understanding of how rich a dramatic construct Cleopatra can be, and of 
how that adds to the range of representations of human behaviour to be found in 
Shakespearean drama. The character’s insight, in her brief discussion with Charmian in 
1.3, into “the method” (1.3.8; which role to play, and how) to secure an emotional 
ascendant over the powerful men on her politico-sexual curriculum is a case in point for 
the intra-dramatic theatrical awareness so often to be found in Shakespeare. Since the 
dramatic framework for this key discussion consists of practical demonstrations of 
Cleopatra’s ability to match action to desired effect, her metatheatrical savvy seems at 
this point to suggest that she might be an enkratic counterpoint to Antony’s akrasia —
i.e., enjoying mastery over herself and her circumstance, and hence keeping passions 
from jeopardising balanced deliberation leading to reasoned choices. This possibility, 
however, is belied by an unfolding of the dramatic action that sees Cleopatra lose such 
mastery —and she does so, ironically, in ways that extend the metatheatrical theme.  
Indeed, Cleopatra arguably exchanges an awareness of self that would entail a 
recognition of contingency, and her clear-headed immunity to the intra-dramatic shows 
that she staged them only for their effect on others, for gratifying fictions that may aim 
to obnubilate herself. Her treatment, in 2.5. and 3.3., of the messenger that brings news 
of Antony’s marriage to Octavia amounts to the rejection of a plot and performance 
grounded on actuality (the messenger’s truthful account in 2.5., for which he is harshly 
punished) in favour of a warped version of the actual (when the messenger is coerced 
by violence and bribed with gold to play a redrafted role and offer a representation of 
Octavia that can be accommodated in Cleopatra’s narrative of her own glamorous, 
unrivalled womanhood). This moment of the plot can be read as evincing, again, a 
revealing concomitance of major conditions that otherwise might be alternatives in the 
delineation of an (Aristotelian) akratic profile (throughout Ethics VII: 1-10): the 
messenger’s news is met in 2.5. by impetuosity, under the direct and uncontrolled 
influence of Cleopatra’s passions, and reveal in 3.3. her weakness, when she deliberates 
and makes a choice (to recall the messenger) which nonetheless reflects a passion 
(vanity, self-love) rather than reason; and such akratic conditions are therefore revealed, 
consecutively, as prompted by anger (2.5) and appetite for pleasure (the pleasure of 
erotic self-regard —passim and 3.3). 
Cleopatra’s decisive role at the moment that marks a turning point in her and 
Antony’s fortunes, the battle of Actium, both develops these conditions and confirms 
their gender implications, bound up with expectations of action vs. passivity. Military 
disaster follows Cleopatra’s ill-reasoned deliberation to join the battle herself, or rather 
to “appear there for a man” (3.7.18); and her enthusiastic support of Antony’s decision 
to fight Caesar “by sea, by sea” (3.7.40), against the advice of seasoned officers, and 
with herself  on board “the Egyptian admiral” ship (3.10.2), quickly proves a decision 
against their own interests. The absence in the play of cogent reasons for the naval 
option makes it tempting to argue for vanity (again) as the mainspring for akratic 
behaviour, as if Cleopatra might envisage her presence on board her admiral ship at 
Actium as a sequel for her fabled appearance on her barge at Cydnus. However, a 
crucial difference as regards gendered agency determines a diverse outcome: if on 
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Cydnus Cleopatra takes an initiative in self-staging (“o’erpicturing [...] Venus”), which 
operates through her becoming the object of a delighted universal “gaze” (2.2.210, 
227), at Actium her assumption of an active warlike role (playing Mars) would require 
her to be the subject and source of the gaze —under the representational terms proposed 
by Philo from the first lines of the play, where the general’s “goodly eyes” glow 
undaunted and imperiously “o’er the files and musters of the war” (1.1.2-3). Inability to 
do so makes Cleopatra flee the battle scene, with the destructive results that become 
(again visually) troped in the words of Enobarbus —the same who gave an eyewitness 
account of Cydnus now responding to Actium: “To see’t mine eyes are blasted” 
(3.10.4). 
The invective aimed at Cleopatra, at this point when the scene of her cowardly 
(womanly) flight from the battle makes her the object of visual loathing, rather than 
wonder and desire, is revealingly shown in animal terms: “Yon ribaudred nag of 
Egypt”, “like a cow in June” (3.10.10, 14). Such invective is profoundly ambivalent, 
redolent as it is of that joyful animalisation of the human that marked the literature of 
popular festivity and laughter2 while also inextricably bound up with the character’s 
course towards catastrophe —her own and others’. Further cultural and literary 
associations can be carried by this construction of Cleopatra as an embodiment of the 
tension between (self-)mastery and incontinence (or loss of control), poised (as regards 
the reactions she obtains) between fascination for the “rare Egyptian” whom “age 
cannot wither”, whose power to stimulate unsatiated desire “makes hungry/Where she 
most satisfies” (2.2.228, 245-8), and revulsion at her debasing, bestialising powers, best 
glimpsed in the “monstrous” feasting provided at her Alexandrian court, where she 
“feed[s herself]/With most delicious poison” (1.5.27-8). Such traits —and such 
language— can indeed prove reminiscent of Edmund Spenser’s Acrasia, the “false 
enchaunteresse” who, in Book II of The Faerie Queene, attracts knights to her “Bowre 
of blis”, where “she makes her louers drunken mad”, binds them “in chaines of lust and 
lewd desires” and turns them into beasts (II.1.51-4, II.12.84-5). 
Despite the impression of obviousness conveyed by the character’s name and 
description, the relevance of the Spenserian analogy to the concerns of this paper is 
rather limited. As the bane of “Temperaunce”, Spenser’s Acrasia stands for 
dissoluteness, “lewd loues, and wastfull luxuree” (II.12.80); and this, even if 
allegorically construed as epitomising a broader human proneness to temptation, is only 
one dimension in the range of forms that lack of self-mastery may acquire in the 
readings of tragic characters that I am here pursuing, informed by Plato’s and 
Aristotle’s disquisitions of akratic/enkratic behaviour. Further, Spenser’s character 
remains firmly within the bounds of an allegorical framework in which her significance 
is fixed and immutable. This makes her quite unlike the evolving instabilities that 
define Shakespeare’s representations of the human through the key characters in the 
tragedies in question, especially when they resume dramatic control and achieve 
greatness at the cost of self-destruction —while embodying that “radical individuation” 
that has been argued to mark Shakespeare’s “startling departure from the norms of 
beauty that governed Renaissance taste” (Greenblatt 2010: 4-5). 
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Cleopatra’s reclamation of mastery over herself and her circumstance will only be 
realised through her suicide —which in her case (differently from Antony) allows her to 
fully match effect against intent. This, which is arguably the case with most tragic 
protagonists whose demise is self-inflicted, is certainly an element in common between 
the two tragedies here considered, also connected by the alterity that defines both 
Cleopatra (“gipsy” queen) and Othello (general and “blackamoor”). Additionally, the 
two tragedies highlight the cogency of gender expectations for an understanding of 
agency and akrasia; and they both show significant variations in self-control and self-
awareness on the part of the main characters. 
In the case of Othello, such variations are closely imbricated with the reasons for a 
rather evident distinction between Act I (as argued long ago by Susan Snyder, a small 
romantic comedy plot on its own —Snyder 1979: 70-90) and the rest of the play. 
Indeed, in Act I both Othello and Desdemona appear in full possession of themselves 
and their lot, matching volition and achievement, and the playwright emphasises this in 
a variety of ways. In the case of the title character, this is done in particular through that 
much-noted contrast between the traits that Iago ascribes to Othello in absentia, in his 
opening speech, and the characterisation defined by the Moor’s first presence on stage 
(in 1.2). Iago famously describes Othello in 1.1 as “loving his own pride and purposes” 
—a formula that binds self-concern to heightened intentionality in the Moor’s supposed 
character and behaviour— and suggests that such features are verbally matched by “a 
bombast circumstance/Horribly stuffed with epithets of war” (1.1.11-13). Conversely, 
the economy of word and action in Othello’s first stage appearance suggests rather calm 
and ostensible modesty, which here become a badge of the character’s mastery over 
himself and others; this is conveyed both through his concise response to Iago’s 
provocative reporting of Brabantio’s invective and his own assurances to his unwilling 
father-in-law, “you shall more command with years/Than with your weapons” (1.2.60-
1). 
Indeed, this very belief that an identity acknowledged as authoritative is more 
effective towards the attainment of one’s goals than the incidentality of one’s gestures 
and words, however forceful and cogent they may be, was previously manifested both 
to Iago and Cassio in Othello’s references to the credit he expects to derive from “my 
services, which I have done the signiory”, “My parts, my title and my perfect soul” 
(1.2.18, 31). This is an expectation that the showdown at the Senate fully confirms, 
when a combination of reputation and measured words grants an (at this point) 
apparently enkratic Othello his intended effect —the social and legal validation of his 
elopement with Desdemona. Othello and Desdemona in fact converge in this, since the 
young woman’s reasoned presentation of her case to the authorities equally proves her 
ability to match her forcefully assumed agency —elopement followed by fearless 
manifestation of her will in front of the Senate— to her intended effect. This is 
pointedly achieved over and above the authority of her own father, a Venetian 
Magnifico who appeals to the Duke and his peers only to hear his daughter demote his 
entitlements to a token share in her now “divided duty” (1.3.181). Desdemona proceeds 
to sealing her brief moment of mastery (promptly to be cancelled by wifely submission) 
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by wresting from the Duke’s “voice”, in an arch-patriarchal environment, the “charter” 
that allows her to claim “the rites for which I love him” (martial? connubial?) and 
follow the husband she has chosen as he “go[es] to the war” (1.3.246, 257-8). 
However, and from this perspective, Othello and Desdemona might be seen as 
distinct characters for the rest of the play. Indeed, everything that happens in Othello 
from Act II onwards also provides a standpoint from which, retrospectively, the actions 
of the Moor and his bride in Act I (despite the immediate success they then obtained, or 
by contrasting such success with subsequent effects) might arguably be read as not 
reflecting reasoned choices, and in fact akratically working against the characters’ own 
interests. It is not my purpose to revisit the rhetorical intricacies of Iago’s corruption of 
Othello’s judgement throughout the play (reviewing the critical attention that this has 
obtained would almost amount to charting the critical processing of the play from the 
Romantics to the present). I will merely add that Iago’s effect on Othello offers a 
succession of demonstrations of how a character’s passions can be activated to impair 
adequate reasoning, even on those occasions when Othello may seem to be weighing 
and deliberating, rather than acting impetuously under the effect of unprocessed 
emotions. Indeed, moments of ostensibly dispassionate assessment of self and 
circumstance —“Haply for I am black ...” (3.3.267)— seem to have a mitigating effect 
upon those other moments when Othello’s discourse and/or action become (indeed) 
“incontinent”, emotionally unbalanced and outright violent: “I will chop her into 
messes!” (4.1.197). Alternation between moments of one type and the other arguably 
allows the character to develop a sense of righteousness and justification, a belief in the 
rationality of his mental processes —“I’ll see before I doubt, when I doubt, prove” 
(3.3.193)— and hence also the sense of justified and dignified outrage that leads him to 
construe Desdemona’s killing as a “sacrifice” (for which he poses as controlled, 
enkratic high priest)  rather than a “murder” (5.2.65). 
Desdemona’s case, in fact, may appear as a more enlightening object for critical 
application of the notion of akrasia, since context and rhetoric provide the means for 
audiences to perceive her decisions and actions in Cyprus as, in all likelihood, 
producing effects contrary to those she envisages. The beginning of the play’s longest 
and most decisive scene, 3.3, sees Desdemona commit herself to Cassio’s cause with a 
zest and assurance that can hardly be supported by the dramatic circumstance. 
Ostensibly, she listens, deliberates and only then makes promises —which might 
suggest that her akratic actions do not arise from impetuosity. However, as Cassio’s 
would-be advocate regarding an issue (the loss of his lieutenancy) that previous 
passages in text and plot defined as sensitive —the play opens, after all, with echoes of 
the resentment caused by Cassio’s appointment in the first place— Desdemona takes on 
a vicarious authority that she plainly cannot claim: “I give thee warrant of thy place” 
(3.3.20). This promise, made by an ageing general’s young wife to his disgraced 
handsome lieutenant, might seem to belong within the range of a comic plot —in line, 
indeed, with such tales of sex and risible deceit as had prevailed in Italian reworkings of 
the Classical comic mould that left their imprint on Shakespeare, the Venetian 
background suggesting the cogency of Othello’s wariness of Pantalone’s inexorable fate 
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(Salingar 1974: 189-90 and passim; Ellis 2009: 93-5 and passim). Indeed, the potential 
risibility and topsy-turveydom of Desdemona’s assumption of a power that is “public” 
but nonetheless grounds itself on connubial and domestic prerogatives of bed and board 
is heightened by the itemisation of her programme: “My lord shall never rest,/I’ll watch 
him tame and talk him out of patience,/His bed shall seem a school, his board a 
shrift,/I’ll intermingle everything he does/With Cassio’s suit” (22-6). In another 
dramatic framework, Desdemona’s ensuing injunction —“be merry, Cassio” (26)— 
might sound consensual and sharable, but the context and verbal realisation of her 
intentions endow them with an akratic crassness that validates rather the unwitting 
prescience of her closing words: “thy solicitor shall rather die/Than give thy cause 
away” (27-8). 
The negative effects of Desdemona’s intention and verbal action quickly unfold 
throughout this scene, which closes (nearly 400 lines later) with Othello confirming 
Iago rather as his lieutenant, and vowing death both to Cassio and “the fair devil” (481). 
The contrast between this and Desdemona’s ability to match deliberation, action and 
speech to her intents in Act I —that ability, in her plea before the Senate, to get timing, 
register, and urgency right, thus securing the legal and social validation of her wishes— 
could hardly be greater. Indeed, if one takes Desdemona’s dramatic identity as 
established in Act I, then the rest of the play shows her akratically (in Socratic terms) 
always “inferior to herself”. And if the matter of Cassio’s lost lieutenancy involved 
compromise and power dynamics in the predominantly patriarchal world of action and 
public office, Desdemona’s incapacity to understand the world of women as also 
including ethical uncertainties is equally displayed in her dialogue with Emilia in 4.3 
(and could be taken as a case in point for the complexities attending on the much 
stressed notion of “Shakespeare’s modernity in his treatment of women” —Dusinberre 
1996: 5). Desdemona’s wide-eyed naiveté —“Dost thou in conscience think (...)/That 
there be women do abuse their husbands (...) ?” (60-1)— proves strangely out of 
character coming from the young woman who had enough savvy to transgress against 
male authority and elope with the Moor into the Venetian night. Unless, of course, one 
judges the (un)reasoned nature of decisions leading to agency strictly on the basis of 
their final (rather than immediate) effects, and deems Othello and Desdemona’s original 
transgression as the fundamentally akratic gesture that ultimately proves detrimental to 
its agents’ best interests —i.e., the preservation of their lives. 
The pathos of Desdemona’s demise is undeniable, but it is strictly that of 
victimhood: the plot and text of Othello do not allow the play’s main female character 
to be reclaimed to her former (ostensible, illusory?) mastery over self and circumstance. 
If a woman is endowed with that possibility in Othello it is rather Emilia —who, 
ironically, proved venal in her theft of the handkerchief, but knowledgeable about 
women and men in her dialogue with Desdemona in 4.3; indeed, her decision to rescue 
her mistress’s reputation and memory from obloquy is matched by decisive verbal 
action that ensures the success of her intent —even at the cost of her own life. From this 
angle, Emilia, rather than Desdemona, anticipates Othello’s final self-redemptive (and 
self-destructive) matching of intent, action and effect through word and sword —the 
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weapons that proved ultimately of no avail to the disgraced akratic general in the other 
tragedy discussed above. 
This discussion of perplexing discontinuities between intention and action in the 
representations of individual behaviour to be found in Antony and Cleopatra and 
Othello has focused on matters of plot and characterisation that have more often than 
not been tackled with conceptual tools developed within rather different frameworks. 
Traditionally, these have included and given pride of place to classical tragic theory, in 
particular when moulded on Aristotle’s Poetics, which famously grounds the fallibility 
and inconsistency of human action on character flaws, leading to crucial error, assisted 
by hubris, and set off or accentuated by plot reversals or peripeteias. But the critical 
processing of the perplexities posed by agency in these Shakespeare tragedies has been 
decisively inflected by the centrality of their key characters to the reconfiguration of 
Shakespearean criticism, since the final quarter of the twentieth century, under the 
impact of critical models based on gender and ethnicity —and this in an intellectual 
environment largely formatted by the altered rapport of text and context that defined 
what twenty years ago could generically be called “the new contextualisms” (Felperin 
1990: vi and passim). 
The discussion above, conceptually driven as it is, does not propose itself as a 
regressive instance of a criticism grounded on a sense of immutable human nature, a 
criticism striving for the ahistorical and apolitical; on the contrary, it is supported at all 
points by an awareness that the gap between volition and agency on which it focuses 
has its depth of meaning and potential pathos extended by a sense of the contingencies 
and iniquities of history and power. It is such an awareness that allows for Roman 
denunciations of Antony’s transgressiveness and Cleopatra’s crafty manoeuvring —
themselves existing in a tension between the akratic and the enkratic— to be read as 
issuing from the same gender typecasting; for Othello’s transit from enkratic assurance 
to akratic, uncontrollable rage to be perceived as the Moor’s inexorable demotion to the 
negative racial profile of which, at the outset, he was proudly and pointedly the 
opposite; and for the near commutation of Desdemona’s and Emilia’s respective 
akratic/enkratic selves to be seen as shedding light on women’s strife to propel 
character beyond circumstance —which also means, beyond the risible or despicable 
traits of female dramatic types (between naiveté and venality). 
Such insights can be extended and consolidated when the challenges faced by the 
central characters in these tragedies are considered in the light of a problem that has 
energised discussions of human agency since antiquity —the perplexity posed by 
contradictions between the shape and content of one’s decisions and their achieved 
effects, in the light of one’s interests and goals. Taking the instances of human 
singularity afforded by Antony and Cleopatra and Othello, indeed prominent cases of 
early modern “radical individuation” (Greenblatt 2010: 5), and discussing them from 
the perspective of akrasia, pointedly validates the intellectual longevity of this notion; 
but it no less emphatically confirms the continued (however variable and evolving) 
imaginative consequence of Shakespeare’s representations of human experience. 
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Notes 
 
1. Though first published in 1954, Madeleine Doran’s Endeavors of Art remains possibly, 
in her section on the de casibus tradition, the clearest disquisition on the topic since the mid-
twentieth century (1964: 116-28); for more recent studies, see Budra 2000: 15-16 and passim; 
Kastan 2007: 7-8; and Pincombe 2010: 3-6. 
2. As abundantly proved, over the past three decades, in the many studies of early modern 
writing that have derived their conceptual framework from Mikhail Bakhtin’s influential 
Rabelais and His World ([1965] 1984). 
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